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8The Regulation of Transborder Network Services
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Abstract
Integration and reinforcement of network infrastructure for transport, energy and
water is a key component in the European policy framework for market competi-
tiveness. However, in spite of considerable analysis and community co-funding since
1995, actual implementation progress for the 90 priority projects in the Transeuropean
Energy Networks programme has been meager.
The estimated network investment need of 40,000 Me (2003-2013) is challenging
the current heterogenous institutional mix of European network operators, regulators
and the role of the commission. This paper presents an analytic framework for the
network investment problem under decentralized control in both regulation, infrastruc-
ture ownership and management. Our results on the underinvestment problem from
regulatory competition and non-coordination provide insights into the policy relevant
topic of common infrastructure investment under varying budget balancing constraints
and management objectives. From an economic policy viewpoint, the paper is tan-
gential to the more general discussion on regulatory centralization vs. subsidiarity in
the European Union.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L51, L92, L94.
Keywords: Access Pricing, Regulation, Investment.
1 Introduction
One of the crucial consequences of the free mobility principle in the European union is the
establishment of an adequately capacitated infrastructure to enable the free circulation of
information, energy, goods and human resources. Any impediments in the establishment,
maintenance or continuous expansion of these infrastructures to enable intra-community
exchanges pose important policy problems in terms of integration, socio-economic equity
and market eﬃciency. Tight budget constraints in combination with an increased use of
regional and international infrastructure for energy, road and rail transport have actual-
ized the policy question of the interaction between network regulation and interconnection
investment incentives. In particular, consider the deregulated markets for electricity, gas
∗IAG & CORE. Address: Universit´ e Catholique de Louvain. E-mail: agrell@poms.ucl.ac.be.
†CREST-LEI & CEPR. Address: LEI-ENPC, 28 rue des Saints-P` eres, 75343 Paris Cedex 07, France.





































8and rail transport that draw on capital intensive, nationally regulated and operated infras-
tructures (grids, corridors) to provide energy and services internationally. In the European
setting, these latter services enjoy the wide-ranging rights to access markets without bar-
riers to the price, mode or type of services provided. However, the weak coordination of
the ﬁnancing and regulatory solutions for the networks has a real impact on the allocation
of the fruits of the intracommunity trade, its rate of expansion and the stability of its
ﬁnancing solution. The objective of this paper is to address some of the policy issues in
interconnection investment provision using a minimal model of regulatory competition in
networks.
The ﬂexible model that we describe below may be interpreted and applied in a range
of institutional settings, but we will provide a few illustrative examples to motivate its
construction.
Electricity transmission. The backbone of the unbundled electricity network1, the national
high-voltage grid and the interconnections, are operated by transmission system operators
(TSO). In Europe, the TSO are national entities subject to diﬀerent regulatory regimes,
ownership structures and operating conditions. The energy itself is only exchanged at
a few trading places (such as Nord Pool and APX) under the direct supervision of the
TSO. The eﬃciency of these markets depends crucially on the ability and willingness of
the TSO to identify, relieve and manage the interconnections between grids. However,
the national incentives and regulations facing the TSOs may provide ambiguous welfare
eﬀects. E.g., the Scandinavian power exchange Nord Pool was created jointly by the
Swedish TSO (Svenska Kraftn¨ at) and the Norwegian TSO (Statnett SF). The former is
a publicly operated agency with soft budget constraints and a wide authority, whereas
the latter is proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm subject to a high-power incentive regime and national
investment reviews. Currently, NordPool is 80% owned by the Nordic TSOs. In intercon-
nected networks with trade, the diﬀerent investment and ﬁnancing modes clearly aﬀect
the organizational objectives of these managers.2
Road transportation. In road transport and highway infrastructure, we note that the
ﬁnancing solutions for bordering high-transit countries such as Austria, Germany and
Switzerland diﬀer in terms of share of public funding, variable and ﬁxed tariﬀs. Contrasting
the French situation (no ﬁxed national road-use tariﬀs and high variable tolls) with the
German solution (high national fees, introducing moderate transit fees in 2004), one may
inquire whether the current regulatory interaction is plausible to induce a stable and
unique access price equilibrium.
International railways. Finally, in railroads, the French charging system has enabled the
national infrastructure manager (RFF) to cover about 25% of its total cost, while the
percentage is 40% for the Austrian counterpart (SCHIG); on the other hand, the German
1See EC directive 2003/54/EC.
2Another example relates to interconnections between the Netherlands and Germany, where a tightly
regulated Dutch TSO (TenneT) under a high-powered revenue cap until 2004 was facing integrated ﬁrms
enjoying very lax regulation. By contrast, Germany had no electricity regulator until July 2004. Here,
the behavior of the German counterparts, internalizing downstream market rents in their transit and
grid tariﬀs, as well as capacity management, may have a signiﬁcant impact of the social welfare on the
competitive Dutch side. The six German TSOs controlled up to 85% of the generator capacity and up to





































8access pricing system has been set with the aim of recovering all costs, excluding those
related to new or enhanced infrastructure. In view of these diﬀerences, particular attention
should be devoted to infrastructure access pricing for inter-network services, as forcefully
emphasized in EC Directive 14/2001, which upholds that coordination across countries is
required in order to avoid the negative impact of the lacking harmonization of charging
systems.
As we will show in this paper, the answers to these important policy questions are
far from trivial and highly dependent on the incumbent institutional structure in the
interfacing jurisdictions. Seen from a public economy viewpoint, our results can inform
a debate on the costs and beneﬁts of centralization vs. decentralization of infrastructure
regulation in open trade zones such as the European union.
In our model, which builds on Bassanini and Pouyet (2003), a downstream sector
requires the access to two national networks to produce a ﬁnal service. The consumers’
surplus associated to the provision of the ﬁnal good is shared across the two countries; in
each country, an infrastructure manager is in charge of determining the levels of subsidy
and the tariﬀ for the access to the domestic network which maximize domestic welfare
while preserving the ﬁnancial viability of the local infrastructure. Under non-cooperation
across countries, two externalities are created because of the incomplete internalization
both of the total consumers’ surplus and of the total infrastructure costs associated to the
downstream service. We show that these externalities typically push the local access prices
up, leading to too high a price for the ﬁnal service. We carefully study the countries’ best-
responses in access prices and prove that a multiplicity of equilibria emerge. Intuitively, the
optimal access price set in one country depends on the expectation about the access price
set in the other country: if one country anticipates a high access price in the rival country,
then it is led both to subsidize its infrastructure and to implement a high access price
because it expects a low demand and consequently a low access revenue. Interestingly
enough, given that access prices are excessively distorted upwards, a conﬁguration in
which infrastructures earn positive proﬁts is possible; this arises in particular when one
country does not value the consumers’ surplus associated to the ﬁnal service (a so-called
‘pass-through’ country). Were the countries perfectly cooperating, such a case would
never arise. Indeed, in the standard Ramsey-Boiteux framework, as soon as the as the
networks exhibit increasing returns to scale, pricing access to marginal cost violates the
infrastructure budget constraint. Although the multiplicity of equilibria might not be
appealing from a theoretical standpoint, we argue that it depicts well the institutional
variety that we observe in the regulation of network industries across Europe.
We then turn on to the principal policy question in this paper, namely that of infras-
tructure investment. We consider a simple two-stage game in which countries choose ﬁrst
the investment levels and then decide the infrastructure ﬁnancing (i.e., access prices and
subsidies) policies. We ﬁrst show that if countries devote no public funds to the ﬁnancing
of their domestic networks, then they have no incentive to invest to enhance their infras-
tructures. Intuitively, a strict budget balance requirement leads to an unstable equilibrium
in access prices; this property implies that any decrease of the best-response in access price





































8strong increase of the equilibrium access prices. We then show that provided that a stable
equilibrium in access prices is obtained, the non-cooperative countries always have too
low incentives to invest in their domestic networks with respect to the socially optimal
investment levels. Hence, and not surprisingly, there would be some gain to coordinate the
investment decisions at a supra-national level. However, we also show that coordinating
the investment without a strong coordination of the access pricing decisions in unlikely
to bring strong beneﬁts. A coordinated decision on the investment would ideally try to
correct for the distortion on the access prices that are created by the non-cooperative
behavior of the countries at the second stage of the game; we show that this correction is
limited and that coordinated investment in our context is only guided by its impact on the
infrastructure costs. We conclude this section by discussing how our results can shed some
light on the failure of recent European investment projects in the electricity industry.
While most of the paper assumes for tractability that the downstream sector behaves
perfectly competitively, we relax this assumption in the last section. We consider a down-
stream monopolist which perfectly discriminates the ﬁnal consumers and infrastructure
managers oﬀer now non-linear access pricing schemes. In that context, we show that the
distortion, at the margin, on the access prices are removed. Intuitively, the perfectly dis-
criminating downstream ﬁrm creates no eﬃciency loss and captures all the consumers’
surplus; this surplus can be in turn captured back by the infrastructure managers through
non-linear access tariﬀs. Then, under perfect cooperation, the networks are not shut down
as long as the consumers’ surplus for the socially optimal ﬁnal price is larger than the in-
frastructure ﬁxed costs. However, under non-cooperation countries have to agree on the
sharing of the consumers’ surplus; this sharing in turn determines when each country ﬁnds
it preferable to shut down its own network. We show that non-cooperation leads to shut-
down much more frequently than cooperation. While the shut-down of existing networks is
relatively unlikely, our results can be re-interpreted in the following way: non-cooperative
countries have to agree on the mere decision to build a new infrastructure which will be
jointly used to provide international services. Even when there are no ineﬃciencies on
(marginal) access prices due to non-cooperation (because of downstream perfect discrim-
ination combined with non-linear access pricing schemes), there are gains to implement
side-transfers between countries to ensure that socially proﬁtable infrastructure projects
are eﬀectively undertaken.
Throughout the paper, we use the work on regulation under a budget constraint,
pioneered by Boiteux (1956) and Ramsey (1927) in a diﬀerent context. We also refer to
the literature on access pricing and interconnection, which has especially developed as
regards the telecommunications sector; see for instance Laﬀont and Tirole (2000). Chang
(1996) studies the problem of pricing access in a vertically separated industry but does
not consider the issue of interconnection, which is central to our analysis. Armstrong
(2001) analyzes two-way interconnection between telecommunications networks providing
international calling services to captive consumers. Although similar in some respects, our
work is more focussed on the choice of the mode of regulation. As said earlier, our model
builds on the analysis of Bassanini and Pouyet (2003) and extends this setting in diﬀerent






































We consider two countries or regions denoted by i = 1,2. In country i, an infrastructure
manager, denoted hereafter by IMi, is in charge of the regulation of a domestic network.
Regulation encompasses both the pricing of the access to the infrastructure and the amount
of public funds dedicated to the ﬁnancing of the network: denote by ai and ti the unit
access price and the amount of subsidy to infrastructure i respectively. Downstream
operators use both networks to provide a ﬁnal services to end users.3
The downstream sector produces one good or service at a constant unit cost cd. The
ﬁnal demand function for that good is denoted by q(.) (with q0 < 0). For instance, one
could think of round-trip transportation services from one country to the other or elec-
tricity exchange across countries. We denote by η the elasticity of that demand w.r.t. the
price p, i.e., η =
−q0p
q . Up to Section 5, the downstream sector is assumed to behave com-
petitively, which arises when downstream operators wage ﬁerce Bertrand-like competition.
Hence, the price of the ﬁnal service paid by end-users is given by p = a1 + a2 + cd.4
The objective of a regulator is to maximize domestic welfare deﬁned as the sum of three
terms: ﬁrst, the fraction of the net surplus associated to the ﬁnal services which accrues
to consumers of his country; second, the infrastructure proﬁt; and third, the fraction of
downstream operators proﬁt which beneﬁts his citizens through, say, shares held by these
citizens.
A salient feature of transborder services is that the beneﬁts associated to these services
are shared across countries. Consequently, we consider that country i internalizes a fraction
θi ∈ (0,1) of the total net consumers’ surplus S(q) associated to the ﬁnal services.
In order to produce a quantity q of ﬁnal services, downstream operators must obtain
access to both networks. For a given quantity q of ﬁnal services produced by th downstream
sector, the cost of operating the infrastructure in country i is given by cuq + ki, where cu
is the infrastructure marginal cost and ki is the infrastructure ﬁxed cost. In our setting,
the revenue generated by the pricing of access in country i is given by aiq. On top of that
access revenue, we consider that IMi is allowed to provide the domestic infrastructure
with a subsidy ti ≥ 0; to capture in our partial equilibrium framework the imperfection
of the taxation system and the distortions it generates in the rest of the economy, we
consider there is a cost of levying public funds which is denoted by λpf > 0.
Finally, since downstream operators are assumed to behave competitively, their proﬁt
is always null.
Summarizing, the problem of IMi can be stated as follows:
max
{ai,ti≥0}
θiS(q) − (1 + λpf)ti + π
infra
i
s.t. (BBi) : π
infra
i ≡ ti + (ai − cu)q − ki ≥ 0.
3Although they admittedly are an important dimension of the diﬃculty faced by regulatory authorities,
we abstract from informational asymmetries between the infrastructure managers and the downstream
sector.
4We consider the simplest form of complementarity between the two networks, in which producing one
unit of ﬁnal service requires to use one unit of each infrastructure; more complex patterns of complemen-





































83 Competition between Infrastructure Managers
We consider the game in which the infrastructure managers choose non-cooperatively
and simultaneously the access price and the level of subsidy dedicated to their respective
infrastructure.
3.1 Best-responses
To characterize the best-responses of the infrastructure managers, notice that the level of
infrastructure subsidy in, say, country j does not directly aﬀect the optimization prob-
lem faced by the infrastructure manager in country i; consequently, the equilibria of the
game between infrastructure manager can be found by focusing on each country’s “pseudo
reaction-function” in access price.
Two intuitions are worth emphasizing at this stage. First, the presence of externalities
across countries implies that access prices are excessively distorted: indeed, each regulator
has a monopoly position over his infrastructure and does fully internalize neither the
whole consumers’ surplus nor the total infrastructure costs associated to the ﬁnal services.
This double marginalization eﬀect raises the possibility that the infrastructure revenue is
large enough to cover the infrastructure cost without any subsidy. Second, the beneﬁt of
providing the infrastructure with a subsidy and relieving the burden on the access price
has to be weighted against its cost in terms of cost of public funds.
Taking those remarks into account and considering country i, we are led to distinguish
three regimes. The formal derivation of these cases is relegated in Appendix A.1. In
particular, we need to impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Deﬁne δ ≡
qq00−q02
q02 . In the relevant range, δ ≤ 1
2−(θi+θj).
Parameter δ relates to the log-concavity/convexity of the ﬁnal demand and can be
positive (the case of an iso-elastic demand), null (the case of an exponential demand) or
negative (the case of a linear demand).5 The condition stated in Assumption 1 ensures
that the best-responses of the infrastructure managers can be characterized by ﬁrst-order
conditions.
Regime 1: No subsidy and a proﬁtable infrastructure. Suppose that the budget-constraint
is not binding in country i; since transfers are socially costly, IMi has no incentives to











Intuitively, consider the polar case in which country i would not internalize any fraction of
the whole surplus, i.e., θi = 0. Then, IMi could be viewed as an “infrastructure monopoly”
5This parameter typically appears in contexts in which two competing ﬁrms oﬀer complementary prod-
ucts; see Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997) for instance.
6We state later on a suﬃcient condition which ensures that the best-response in country i is characterized





































8since it is only interested in the infrastructure proﬁt and, indeed, the optimal access price
in that context looks like the standard monopoly price.
This regime occurs as long as the infrastructure proﬁt in country i remains positive,
which depends on the level of access price anticipated in country j;7 intuitively, if aj
remains suﬃciently low, then the ﬁnal price of international services is low and the demand
is high, implying that the infrastructure in country i can earn positive proﬁts through the
pricing of its access. Deﬁne aj the value of the access price in country j such that the
infrastructure proﬁt in country i, [a1
i(aj)−cu]q(a1
i(aj)+aj+cd)−ki, is exactly null; hence,
Regime 1 occurs as long as aj ≤ aj.
Regime 2: No subsidy and no infrastructure proﬁt. When the regulator in country i
anticipates a larger but moderate access price in the rival country, then the infrastructure
is no longer proﬁtable. Some upward distortion is required to ensure that the budget-
balance requirement is met.
Assume for the moment that IMi does not use public funds to cover the infrastruc-
ture costs, i.e., ti = 0. Throughput the paper, we refer to such a situation as a ‘strict
budget constraint’ in country i, that is, IMi covers the infrastructure costs solely through
access revenues. Denoting by λi the Lagrange multiplier associated to the strict budget












Intuitively, Regime 2 holds as long as the shadow cost of infrastructure ﬁnancing through
access pricing alone, embodied in λi, remains lower than the cost of public funds λpf. In
line with the intuition, we show in Appendix A.1 that λi increases with the access price set
in country j. For future references, denote by aj the value of the access price in country
j such that λi(aj) = λpf; hence, Regime 2 occurs as long as aj ≤ aj ≤ aj.
Regime 3: Subsidy and no infrastructure proﬁt. The last regime occurs when access pricing
as the unique instrument to cover the infrastructure cost leads to too large a distortion on
the access price, i.e., when aj ≥ aj. In that case, the infrastructure manager in country i













7It also depends on the level of infrastructure cost in country i. Notice that Bassanini and Pouyet
(2003) implicitly rule out this case from the analysis by assuming simultaneously that the infrastructure
ﬁxed costs and the countries’ valuations for the ﬁnal services are high enough. By contrast, our analysis
covers all the possible cases.
8For the ease of the exposition, we dot not consider the uninteresting cases in which the access price












































i(aj) if aj ≤ aj,
a2
i(aj) if aj ≤ aj ≤ aj,
a3
i(aj) if aj ≥ aj.
For future references, it turns out to be useful to focus on the nature of the strategic
interaction between access prices, i.e., on the slope of the infrastructure managers’ reaction
functions.









1−(1−θi)δ in Regime 1,
1+λi−θi
θi in Regime 2,
(1+λpf−θi)δ
1+λpf−(1+λpf−θi)δ in Regime 3.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In the second regime, access prices are always strategic complements, i.e., reaction
functions are upward-sloping whatever the characteristics of the ﬁnal demand. Intuitively,
in that regime IMi sticks to a strict budget balance constraint which thus fully character-
izes its access price; if country j increases its own access price, thereby depreciating the
ﬁnal demand and decreasing the infrastructure revenue in country i, IMi needs to increase
in turn his access price to satisfy the strict budget constraint.
In the other regimes, access pricing is less constrained (either because the budget
constraint is not binding or because the infrastructure manager uses an additional in-
strument, namely the subsidy) and depends on the characteristics of the ﬁnal demand. In
particular, under Assumption 1, when δ ≤ 0 (respectively, δ ≥ 0) access prices are strategic
substitutes (respectively, strategic complements) and best-responses are downward-sloping
(respectively, upward-sloping).
We now have all the ingredients necessary to determine the equilibria of our game. In
Figures 1 and 2, we draw the best-responses in access prices of the infrastructure managers
and focus on the symmetric equilibria that emerge in symmetric situation (i.e., θi = θj
and ki = kj). For future references, denote by (al
i∗,al
j∗) the access prices at a symmetric
equilibrium corresponding to Regime l ∈ {1,2,3}.
3.3 Discussions
Let us introduce the social marginal cost of the downstream services c ≡ 2cu + cd; let us
further consider the following situation: a centralized infrastructure manager maximizes
the joint infrastructure proﬁt, i.e., maxa(a − 2cu)q; then simple computations show that








































8Figure 1: Symmetric equilibria in the case δ ≥ 0.





































8Let us ﬁrst focus on Regime 1. Summing the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions, the
ﬁnal price that prevails in the downstream market is such that:
p − c
p




Hence, when consumers’ surplus is fully distributed across countries, i.e., when θi + θj =
1, the ﬁnal price deﬁned by (1) coincides that the ﬁnal price that would prevail would
the management of both infrastructures be delegated to a centralized proﬁt-maximizing
infrastructure manager. Moreover, when θi + θj < 1, that is, when countries fail to fully
internalize the social value associated to the downstream services, then non-cooperative
regulation of the pricing of access leads to a ﬁnal price above the monopoly price. This
striking comparison strongly calls in favor of ﬁnding ways to implement negotiations among
national infrastructure managers. Note that those negotiations ought to bear not only on
the level of national access prices but also on the mode of ﬁnancing chosen in the diﬀerent
countries since both are intrinsically intertwined.
Consider now Regimes 2 and 3. A quick inspection at Figures 1 and 2 shows that, in
these regimes, the total amount of access prices paid by the downstream sector is larger
than the corresponding amount in Regime 1. The intuition is goes as follows: Regimes
2 and 3 depict cases where, in a given country, it becomes more and more diﬃcult to ﬁ-
nance the networks because that country expects a large access price to be set in the other
country; at equilibrium, when these expectations realize, there is indeed a strong need to
distort the access prices. The interesting point to notice is that these diﬀerent equilibria
may co-exist, thereby highlighting a coordination problem between infrastructure man-
agers. It turns out that under Assumption 1, the equilibria corresponding to Regimes 1
and 3 are stable in the sense of best-response dynamics.9 By contrast, the equilibrium
corresponding to Regime 2 is always unstable.
So far, we have restricted our attention to equilibria in which both countries choose
the same mode of ﬁnancing for their network. Introducing various asymmetries, in the in-
frastructure costs for instance, might lead to asymmetric equilibria in which infrastructure
managers adopt diﬀerent regulatory regimes. In particular, notice that the best-response
of a pass-through country which does not value any fraction of the consumers’ surplus (i.e.,
θi = 0 for instance) always coincide with Regime 1. By contrast, the best-response of a
country which puts suﬃciently high a weight on consumers’ surplus will always coincide to
either Regime 2 or Regime 3. Hence, depending both on diﬀerences in infrastructure costs
and on the sharing of consumers’ surplus across countries, asymmetric mode of network
ﬁnancing across countries can emerge as equilibria of our game.
3.4 Institutional diversity
The current institutional diversity in Europe may serve as illustration to the preceding
analysis. Until June 2004 the European implementation of a common directive for energy






































8ranged from the German vertically integrated operators, subject to only ex post compe-
tition regulation, through ex post low-powered regulation in Sweden and Finland relying
on vertical separation into hundreds of distribution utilities, to the British situation with
highly incentivized operators. All these infrastructure managers are subject to nationally
appointed regulatory authorities using diﬀerent instruments and performance measures.
The lack of regulatory coordination has been explicitly addressed by the European Com-
mission through the oﬃcial mandate allocated to the Council of European Energy Regu-
lators (CEER) 10 under the new directives 2003/54 (electricity) and 2003/55 (gas). Under
the new mandates, the European policy makers may refer directly to a coordinated view-
point on energy network pricing and capacity promotion, rather than relying on bilateral
contacts initiated by third parties (the infrastructure operators).
On rail transport, we notice the diﬀerences in tariﬀ policy between countries that
are exporting vs. transiting international freight. Consider e.g. the fees charged by the
Swedish rail infrastructure manager (Banverket) for freight transport, 0.00096 e/km/ton +
258 e in toll for the border connection between Sweden and Denmark (2003, excluding tax,
accident fees and fuel). The Danish counterpart (Banedanmark) charges 0.24 e/km + 285
e in toll for the interconnection, but in addition 940 e in toll for the Great Belt bridge in
Denmark, necessary to transit goods by rail from Sweden to the continent (2003, excluding
tax, environmental fees and fuel). Without questioning the formal independence of the
infrastructure managers, we notice the diﬀerent importance of rail transport for the do-
mestic operators in Denmark (dominated by the incumbent passenger operator DSB) and
in Sweden (several independent private operators, dominated by freight transportation).
4 The Impact of Infrastructure Investment
The purpose of this section is to understand the countries’ incentives to invest in infras-
tructure’s enhancements, a matter of tantamount importance in network industries. A
simple way to introduce investment in our framework goes as follows: at cost ψ(yi) (with
ψ(.) strictly increasing and convex), country i invests an amount yi to improve the cost
eﬃciency of its infrastructure: for instance, if country i invests an amount yi, then the
marginal infrastructure cost of its network is given by cui(yi) (with cui(.) strictly decreas-
ing and concave). Since investment decisions commit for a long-term the management of
the networks, we consider a two-stage game described as follows:
• First, the countries choose non-cooperatively the levels of investment dedicated to
their networks.
• Second, the infrastructure managers choose the infrastructure ﬁnancing policies ded-
icated to their respective infrastructure.
The access prices setting stage as been considered in the previous section. Hence, we
focus directly on the ﬁrst-stage of our game.






































84.1 The ‘no investment curse’ under binding strict budget constraints
We start our analysis of infrastructure investment by focusing on the situation in which
infrastructure managers do not provide any public funds to their networks and the in-
frastructure budget just breaks even. Hence, as regards access prices we are considering
Regime 2 studied in the previous section. Deﬁne the corresponding welfare in country i





Considering that countries behave non-cooperatively at the ﬁrst-stage of the game, the








Let consider as a ﬁrst step an interior optimum in which the optimal amount of investment














ui(yi) = ψ0(yi). (2)
Condition (2) simply states that, at an interior optimum, the marginal cost of investment
equals its marginal beneﬁt; the marginal gain encompasses both a direct eﬀect on the
access price set in that country, through a reduction of the marginal infrastructure cost,
and a strategic eﬀect, through the change of access price set in country j following a












dcui, which yields a variation
in the net surplus of consumers of country i given by the bracketed term in left-hand side
of (2).
Since access prices are strategic complements under a binding strict budget constraint,
it suﬃces to focus on the sign of
da2
i
dcui. Totally diﬀerentiating the binding strict budget
balance condition in country j and rearranging terms using the ﬁrst-order conditions













Remind that in Regime 2 the multiplier associated to the strict budget constraint in a coun-
try must be positive. This observation immediately allows to prove that the right-hand
side of (3) is negative for all admissible values of the multipliers, or
da2
i
dcui < 0. Conse-
quently, reducing the marginal infrastructure cost in country i, through an infrastructure
investment in that country, leads to a negative impact on welfare in that country since




j∗ as the access prices that result when both
infrastructure managers choose not to subsidize their network and the budget constraints are binding and





































8the ﬁnal price increases!12
Hence, as regards the investment decision in country i we obtain a corner solution in
which that country chooses not to invest at all. At the equilibrium of the two-stage game,
both countries end up not investing in infrastructure enhancements.
Proposition 1. Consider that countries do not provide public funds to ﬁnance their net-
works and that strict infrastructure budget constraints are binding. At a non-cooperative
equilibrium, countries choose not to invest in their respective infrastructure.
The intuition for Proposition 1 can be grasped by coming back to our analysis of non-
cooperative access pricing undertaken in the previous section. We highlighted that under
a binding strict-budget constraint access prices were strategic complements and that best-
responses were always violating the usual stability condition. Hence, a reduction of the
marginal infrastructure cost in one country, which amounts to having the best-response
in access price move downwards, leads to an increase in both access prices at equilibrium,
and thus to a lower net consumers’ surplus.
Proposition 1 clearly calls for a strong form of coordination between the infrastruc-
ture investment decisions across countries. However, the next proposition states another
negative result.
Proposition 2. Consider that countries do not provide public funds to ﬁnance their net-
works and that strict infrastructure budget constraints are binding. Consider that coun-
tries perfectly cooperate when deciding infrastructure investment levels but behave non-
cooperatively at the access pricing stage. Then, at equilibrium, no investment is under-
taken.
Proof. The cooperative infrastructure manager faces the following problem:
max
{yi,yj}
{Wi + Wj − ψ(yi) − ψ(yj)},
where Wi and Wj have been deﬁned previously. In an interior optimum, the ﬁrst-order
12Another interesting way to understand this result goes as follows. Diﬀerentiation of the strict budget






q + (aj − cuj)q0.
The infrastructure proﬁt in country j is concave in aj; under a strict budget constraint IMj sets the lowest
access price consistent with the budget constraint and we have q + (aj − cuj)q
0 > 0. Diﬀerentiation of the













q + (ai + aj − cui − cuj)q
0
q + (aj − cuj)q0 .
Since in a non cooperative equilibrium access prices are distorted beyond the centralized infrastructure
monopoly level (which are characterized by q+(ai +aj −cui −cuj)q
0 = 0, we obtain that
dai
dcui < 0. Hence,
this counter-intuitive result emerges not only because infrastructure managers use a strict budget balance

















































ui(yi) − ψ0(yi) = 0, i 6= j.
Applying an argument similar to the one used to prove Proposition 1, one immediately
shows that a corner solution appears with no investment at equilibrium.
Taken together, Proposition 1 and 2 clearly show the strong interdependency between
the decisions to invest in infrastructure enhancements and the decisions concerning the
mode of ﬁnancing of the national networks. Diﬀerently put, a strong coordination between
countries to decide the amount of infrastructure investment dedicated to the national net-
works is useless absent a strong coordination at the access pricing stage when infrastructure
managers have committed to stick to a strict budget balance.
4.2 Investment decisions under infrastructure ﬁnancing with public funds
We continue our study of the impact of infrastructure investment and consider the case
in which network managers use public funds to ﬁnance their infrastructure (Regime 3).13





∗ the corresponding equilibrium access and ﬁnal prices respectively.
Under non cooperation, the problem faced by country i at the investment stage of the
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The direct eﬀect corresponds to the impact of a marginal increase in the investment level
on the infrastructure cost for ﬁxed access prices: ∂Wi
∂yi = −(1+λpf)q ×c0
ui > 0. Increasing
the investment in country i leads to a positive direct eﬀect on the welfare in that country
since this enables to reduce the infrastructure marginal cost and thus to relieve the burden
imposed on taxpayers to ﬁnance the infrastructure deﬁcit through distortionary taxation.
The strategic eﬀect accounts for the impact of a change in the access price in country
i on the access price set in the bordering country. We show in Appendix A.2 the following
results: welfare in country i decreases with the access price set in country j, or ∂Wi
∂aj < 0;
a reduction of the marginal infrastructure cost in country i leads to a smaller access price
13Results for the case of Regime 1 are qualitatively similar.
14We neglect the second-order conditions; notice that when δ is constant (the case of a linear, exponential





































8set in that country, or
da3
i∗
dcui > 0. The former result simply expresses the fact that a higher
access price in country j contracts the demand for ﬁnal services and thus reduces both
the consumers’ net surplus and the access proﬁt in country i; the latter result is in line
with the intuition.15
Consequently, the sign of the strategic eﬀect is characterized by the sign of the strategic
interaction, or refereeing to Lemma 1, by the sign of δ. Hence, when access prices are
strategic substitutes, i.e., when δ ≤ 0, country i will be reluctant to invest much in
infrastructure enhancement since this tends to increase the access price set in country j;
a reverse result holds when access prices are strategic complements.
In Appendix A.2 we also show that the ﬁrst-order condition (4) can be rewritten as
follows:
−c0
ui(yi)(1 + λpf)q ×
(1 + λpf) − (1 + λpf − θi)δ
(1 + λpf) − δ [2(1 + λpf) − (θi + θj)]
= ψ0(yi). (5)
In order to go further, let us also consider that the marginal infrastructure improvements
due to investment are identical across countries, i.e., c0
ui(.) = c0
uj(.). Then, Equation (5)
shows that if country i values more the ﬁnal services than country j, i.e., θi ≥ θj, the
former country is willing to spend more in infrastructure investment than the latter if and
only if access prices are strategic complements, i.e., if δ ≥ 0.
Indeed, since the direct eﬀect is the same for both countries, the diﬀerences in the
investment incentives across countries stem from diﬀerences in the strategic impact of these
investments. Now, assume for the sake of the exposition that access prices are strategic
complements. Consider that θi ≥ θj; this implies that country j, which internalizes a lower
fraction of net the consumers’ surplus, imposes a higher access price than country i. This
in turn implies that the strategic reaction of country j following a change in access price
in country i is larger than the strategic reaction of country i since, loosely speaking, the
higher the original level of the access tariﬀ is, the more room there is to reduce the access
price. Hence, the country with the larger valuation for the ﬁnal services has a stronger
incentive to invest since it anticipates a larger reduction of the access price set in the other
country. When access prices are strategic substitutes, an opposite reasoning holds and the
low valuation country invests more than the high valuation one.
Under cooperation, the investment levels are decided to maximize the sum of the
countries’ welfare given the non cooperative behavior of infrastructure managers at the
access pricing stage. Focusing on the investment in the infrastructure in country i, we




















ui(yi) = ψ0(yi). (6)
Comparing (4) and (6), we can easily prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider that infrastructure managers use public funds to ﬁnance their
15Remember though that this result holds because best-responses satisfy the stability property, as op-





































8networks and behave non-cooperatively at the access price setting stage. Then, non-
cooperative infrastructure managers always under-invest with respect to the cooperative
benchmark.
The previous proposition states that when deciding their investment levels, non-cooperative
countries do not account for the positive externality they generate on each other; hence,
under-investment occurs at the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The optimal investment levels under cooperation are identical across
countries if and only if cui(.) = cuj(.).
Basically, this lemma states that when a supra-national authority has to decide how
much to invest in the diﬀerent countries, that decision is solely based on the impact of
those investments on the network costs; if those impacts are identical, then no matter
how countries value the ﬁnal services, the supra-national authority should invest the same
levels in both countries.
To understand this result, let us come back to the ﬁrst-order condition (6) and consider
that access prices (ai,aj) emerge from the second stage of the game. In that case, we have
∂Wi
∂aj = −θiq+(ai−cui)q0 which is a priori diﬀerent from
∂Wj
∂ai = −θjq+(aj −cuj)q0. Hence,
one would expect that the supra-national authority invests diﬀerently in the countries
when countries have diﬀerent valuations for the ﬁnal services; however, taking into account
that countries set access prices non-cooperatively at the second stage of the game, it comes





∂ai . Hence, even though countries
value diﬀerently the ﬁnal services, the marginal impact of the access charge in one country
on the welfare in the other country are equalized at the optimum of the second stage of
our game. Thus, there is no need to diﬀerentiate investments levels in the ﬁrst stage since
the marginal non internalized externalities are equalized across countries.
A striking illustration of this result concerns the case with a pass-through country j
(i.e., θj = 0) whereas country i fully internalizes the consumers’ surplus (i.e., θi = 1). In
that extreme scenario the cooperative infrastructure investment levels are identical across
countries.
Broadly speaking, this highlights that coordination at the investment level only is not
suﬃcient to correct for the non-internalized externalities across countries choosing non-
cooperatively their infrastructure ﬁnancing policies. This has the same ﬂavor as Proposi-
tion 2.
4.3 Policy conclusions on investment
The aborted 1,320 MW North-Sea Interconnector (NSI) between Norway and Great Britain
is a striking example of the eﬀects of non-cooperative infrastructure regulations. Connect-
ing the hydrogenerators in Norway with the undercapacitated British grid, depending on
thermal generation at higher prices, was initially considered mutually welfare-increasing
by the involved transmission system operators and their respective regulators. The feasi-
bility studies for NSI were terminated in 2000. On the Norwegian side, the transmission





































8(basically allowing the new asset to enter into the regulated asset base, passing capital
costs onto the downstream sector). Privately owned National Grid, on the British side, did
not obtain such ﬁnancing from the regulatory authorities in United Kingdom, prompting
for an autoﬁnanced solution (merchant lines). Originally planned to be commissioned by
2005, the project was abandoned in spite of European concerns for its system and market
relevance.
5 Consolidation of Downstream Network Operators
The European Directive on the liberalization of international passenger services grants
access rights for international groupings of licensed railway undertakings to operate in-
ternational services between their countries of origin and transit rights in other Member
States. Individual Member States are free to prescribe wider access rights.
Despite nationally regulated infrastructures, the Nord Pool electricity market place is
characterized by tendencies of consolidation at the downstream level, especially in Norway
(57% of generation capacity share by the ﬁve largest ﬁrms). Further, the consolidation
is European, with e.g. the largest energy (electricity and gas) retailer (EON) in Central
Europe posing as the second largest energy retailer in the Nordic market. Naturally, these
operators can exploit any regulatory inconsistencies to extract information rents.
Hence, it becomes of interest to study the situation in which downstream operators
possess some market power. Given that the previous sections focused on perfectly com-
petitive downstream operators, we focus on the polar scenario in which those downstream
ﬁrms perfectly coordinate their pricing decisions, i.e., the downstream networks operators
behave monopolistically.
In order to deal with market power and the corresponding potential eﬃciency losses,
infrastructure managers should adopt two-part access pricing schemes. Indeed, we know
from the textbook monopoly example that correcting for the dead-weight loss associated
to monopoly power can be achieved by subsidizing the monopoly at the margin to correct
for the ﬁrm’s incentive to contract its output. A similar logic applies in our regulated
environment with the addition that the infrastructure regulator captures the downstream
monopoly proﬁt through the ﬁxed-part of the access tariﬀ in order to ﬁnance the infras-
tructure cost.
The analysis of downstream market power can be undertaken under two alternative sce-
narii, which diﬀer according to the pricing scheme adopted by the downstream monopoly.
Under linear pricing, downstream market power indeed generates an eﬃciency loss,
which is corrected by subsidizing (i.e., pricing access below the infrastructure marginal
cost) the ﬁrm at the margin. However, since non-cooperative network managers do not
fully internalize consumers’ surplus and infrastructure costs, there still remains some inef-
ﬁciencies on access prices. The analysis of this case is straightforward and bears a strong
resemblance with the case of perfect competition at the downstream level and will not be
pursued further on.
Alternatively, we could consider that the downstream monopoly discriminates the ﬁ-





































8downstream level generates no eﬃciency loss: we show that allowing for discriminatory
pricing both at the downstream and the upstream levels solves the ineﬃciencies on the
setting of access prices that arise due to the non-cooperation between infrastructure man-
agers; however, we also argue that non-cooperation between network managers gives rise
to another kind of distortion.
Throughout this section, we consider that the downstream monopoly uses a two-part
tariﬀ of the form16 pq + F and the infrastructure manager in country i uses a two-part
access pricing scheme of the form aiq + Ai.
5.1 Perfect cooperation with perfect downstream discrimination




{[p − a]q(p) + F − A} s.t. F ≤ S(q) − (1 + λpf)t,
where a and A are the marginal access price and the ﬁxed access fee imposed by the
unique infrastructure manager. The monopoly cannot ask the consumers a ﬁxed tariﬀ F
larger than their net surplus; since consumers are also the taxpayers in our framework,
that surplus must incorporate the taxes to ﬁnance the networks.
As usual, perfect discrimination calls for a marginal price equal to the perceived
marginal cost of the monopoly (i.e., pm = a + cd) while the ﬁxed-part of the monopoly’s
tariﬀ is set so as to capture all the consumers’ surplus (i.e., Fm = S(q)−(1+λpf)t). Thus,
for a given access tariﬀ, the downstream monopoly proﬁt is equal to
πdown
m = S(q(a + cd)) − (1 + λpf)t − A.
Importantly, notice that the perfectly-discriminating downstream monopoly fully inter-
nalizes consumers’ surplus. Hence, provided that the downstream ﬁrm can perfectly dis-
criminate those consumers, there is no eﬃciency loss associated to downstream market
power.
Let us step back to the common infrastructure regulator’s problem. Total welfare can
be written as follows:
max
{t≥0,a,A}




s.t. πinfra = t + (a − 2cu)q + A − (ki + kj) ≥ 0,
πdown
m ≥ 0,
where α ∈ (0,1) is the valuation for the downstream operators’ proﬁts.17 For consistency
with the analysis undertaken previously, we maintain the (standard) assumption that the
downstream sector’s rents are socially costly, which requires the downstream sector’s proﬁt
16Since consumers are perfectly homogeneous, such a tariﬀ is indeed suﬃcient to perfectly discriminate
the buyers.





































8be less valued than consumer’s welfare in the regulator’s objective function. Hence, the
ﬁxed part of the access tariﬀ is set so as to leave the downstream monopoly with no rent.




s.t. πinfra = t + (a − 2cu)q(a + cd) + A − (ki + kj) ≥ 0,
A = S(q(a + cd)) − (1 + λpf)t.
The crucial feature is that the regulator can ﬁnance the infrastructure cost either with
a subsidy or with the pricing of access; using public funds is costly whereas taxing the
downstream sector through the pricing of access is not. Hence, in order to generate as
much revenue as possible, the network manager sets a marginal access price equals to
the infrastructure marginal cost, i.e., a = 2cu and provides the infrastructure with no
subsidy, i.e., t = 0. The ﬁnal price coincides thus with the socially optimal price, i.e.,
p = p∗ = 2cu + cd.
Intuitively, the downstream monopoly which perfectly discriminates the end-users does
not generate an eﬃciency loss; there is therefore no need to correct for the downstream
monopoly market power. Second, the use of a two-part access pricing scheme allows
to redistribute proﬁt from the downstream sector to the infrastructure at no cost. By
contrast, using subsidy to ﬁnance the infrastructure entails some distortion which are
captured by the shadow cost of public funds. Hence, since the regulator values equally
consumers’ surplus and the infrastructure revenue, it comes naturally that no subsidy are
used (since it reduces consumers’ surplus and therefore the downstream proﬁt gross of the
ﬁxed access fee) and that the downstream proﬁt is fully captured by the ﬁxed part of the
access price and redistributed to the infrastructure.
To conclude, we emphasize that the infrastructure is not shut down as long as the
following condition holds:
No shut-down ⇔ S∗ ≡ S(q(p∗)) ≥ ki + kj.
This condition simply states that if the social value associated to the downstream services
is smaller than the infrastructure costs, then networks ought to be shut down.
5.2 Non-cooperation with perfect downstream discrimination




{[p − ai − aj − cd]q(p) + F − (Ai + Aj)}
s.t. F ≤ S(q) − (1 + λpf)(ti + tj).
The monopoly still perfectly internalizes and captures the whole consumers’ surplus; it
therefore sets a marginal price equals to its perceived marginal cost, i.e., p = ai + aj + cd
and its proﬁt is given by πdown





































8One can easily show that infrastructure managers have no incentive to use subsidies
to ﬁnance their infrastructure, i.e., ti = tj = 0. The problem faced by the infrastructure







s.t. πinfra = (ai − cu)q(ai + aj + cd) + Ai − ki ≥ 0,
πdown
m = S(q) − (Ai + Aj) ≥ 0,
where αi + αj = α. The infrastructure manager in country i sets the ﬁxed part of their
access tariﬀ to capture as much revenue as possible:
πdown
m = 0 ⇔ Ai + Aj = S(q). (7)
Thus, the optimization w.r.t. the marginal access price leads to ai = cu. Diﬀerently stated,
non-cooperation between infrastructure managers does no longer create an ineﬃciency on
the access price. Importantly, the downstream monopoly which perfectly discriminates the
consumers and fully internalizes consumers’ surplus allows the non-cooperating network
managers to coordinate their access pricing decisions.
Notice that the sharing of the downstream proﬁt between network managers is not
deﬁned in our context: Equation (7) only deﬁnes the sum of the access fees imposed by
the network managers.18 To go further on, assume that the sharing is such that:19
Ai = βS∗ and Aj = (1 − β)S∗.
Under non-cooperation, the infrastructure is not shut down as long as each network man-
ager can ensure the ﬁnancing of his own infrastructure, or
βS∗ ≥ ki and (1 − β)S∗ ≥ kj. (8)
With respect to the perfect cooperation benchmark, we observe that these conditions are
more restrictive than under perfect cooperation. Diﬀerently stated, non-cooperation leads
more often to the shut-down of the shared infrastructure. While, under perfect coopera-
tion, the infrastructure is never shut down as long as S∗ ≥ ki +kj, under non-cooperation
it is never shut down only when the infrastructure ﬁxed costs and the bargaining pow-
ers of the network managers are such that the conditions stated in (8) are met. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.
5.3 Coordination in infrastructure investment decisions
The analysis above can be interpreted in several diﬀerent ways. In a ﬁrst and direct
reading, the analysis says that non cooperative infrastructure managers, in their desire
18This highlights the multi-principals nature of our model.






































8Figure 3: Equilibrium conﬁgurations under perfect discrimination at the downstream
level (with c = 2cu + cd)).
to extract as much rent as possible from the downstream sector, may trigger an unstable
situation leading to the shut-down of the interconnection.
There is also a second reading, which is certainly more realistic. Indeed one can
add to the previous analysis a ﬁrst-stage in which countries decide non-cooperatively
to build a complementary fraction of the total shared network. Since it takes two to
tango, the infrastructure is operational if and only if both countries choose to undertake
their respective segments. Our analysis shows that in a number of instances, potentially
Pareto-improving investments are not jointly implemented due to the non-cooperative
behavior of the countries. Hence the role for a supra-national entity that could assure the
implementation by means of e.g. side-transfers across countries.
An interesting illustration of underinvestment by non-cooperative infrastructure man-
agers is found on the French-Spanish border, a highly congested20 area between the high
price Iberian peninsula and the French power grid, dominated by competitive nuclear
generation. European TEN-E funding for feasibility studies for several interconnection
reinforcement has not lead to any realized investments in spite of positive results, lacking
joint authorization from the regulatory authorities and mutual interest from the two in-
frastructure managers in France and in Spain. Here we also note the change of interest in
interconnection capacity as the nationalized generator Electricit´ e de France (EdF) took
control of the fourth largest Spanish generator Hidrocant´ abrico in 2002. The Commission21
explicitly stated an investment in 2,700 MW increased interconnection capacity at the bor-
20See, e.g., IAEW and CONSENTEC (2001).
21Cf. Commission Decision of 19 March 2002 and the Oﬃcial Journal of 13 March 2004 (2004/C 65
E/161), p. 145-146. The Spanish government applied additional pressure by limiting the voting rights






































8der as a condition to approve the acquisition. Note that the condition was jointly posed
to the downstreams generator EdF and the infrastructure manager in France (RTE), an
explicit recognition of the imperfect separation between the interests of the infrastructure
and the national downstream sector when facing investment tradeoﬀs. Spanish government
enforced the supra-national decision by
The previous analysis shows that allowing for price discrimination both at the up-
stream and the downstream levels may soften the distortions on the access prices created
by the non-cooperative behavior of the infrastructure managers. When the downstream
sector performs ﬁrst-degree discrimination and thus internalizes all the consumers’ sur-
plus, the network managers can advantageously use two-part access tariﬀs to capture the
downstream proﬁt, thereby internalizing the non-internalized externalities. This is in line
with Laﬀont and Tirole (2000, Chapter 3)’s discussion on the rhetoric about fair and non-
discriminatory access prices: in regulated environments, allowing for some form of price
discrimination might sometimes be optimal. This result ought to be qualiﬁed though:
ﬁrst, even though the marginal distortion on the access prices are removed (the marginal
access prices are equal to the marginal infrastructure costs), there appears another kind
of distortion, on the mere decision to run the networks. Second, discrimination at the
downstream level might be imperfect (because of asymmetric information for instance),
thereby leading to only some eﬃciency losses and imperfect internalization of consumers’
surplus between countries.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have modeled the interaction between network regulators who price
the access to their respective infrastructure. These national networks are used as com-
plementary inputs by downstream ﬁrms to produce transborder services. We found that
the choice of equilibrium access prices and infrastructure ﬁnancing systems is typically
plagued by a multiplicity of equilibria, which highlights the need for coordination between
national network regulators. As regards investments, we have shown that countries which
commit to a strict budget balance ﬁnancing system (i.e., the access to the infrastructure
is priced at the average infrastructure cost) have no incentives to invest in their networks;
indeed, in that context a reduction of the infrastructure cost leads to an increase of both
access prices once the strategic response by the neighboring country is properly taken
into account. When countries ﬁnance their networks with a subsidy, there remains an
incentive to undertake some investment; however, countries typically tend to under-invest
w.r.t. the socially optimal levels. In both cases, we have argued that in order to improve
welfare, some coordination by a supra-national authority is required; however, as our anal-
ysis suggests, for such coordination to be eﬀective, it must deal with all dimensions of the
regulatory interventions: the investment, the access pricing and the infrastructure subsidy
decisions.
Our analysis is only a ﬁrst step in the analysis of the institutional design of network
industries. For instance, we have always considered that the network manager and its
political principal were merged into a unique entity. It would be interesting to relax





































8the political principal and the infrastructure manager or some form of horizontal integra-
tion between national infrastructure managers becomes optimal. This is left for future
research.22






































A.1 Competition between infrastructure managers
Regimes 1 & 3. Let us ﬁrst consider Regime 1. Consider an interior solution of IMi’s
problem, in which ai is characterized by the following ﬁrst-order condition: ai − cu =
(1 − θi)
q
−q0. The local second-order condition amounts to δ ≤ 1
1−θi, which holds under
Assumption 1. Totally diﬀerentiating this condition w.r.t. ai and aj we obtain dai
daj =
(1−θi)δ
1−(1−θi)δ. Hence, under Assumption 1, we have Sign[dai
daj] = Sign[δ]. In order to ensure
that the equilibrium corresponding to both infrastructure managers being in Regime 1 is
stable, we need to assume that δ ≤ 1
2−(θi+θj), which corresponds to Assumption 1.
Computations for Regime 3 are similar and immediately adapted. Notice that under
Assumption 1, the local second-order condition as well as the stability condition are met.
Regime 2. At the solution of IMi’s problem, ai and λi are characterized by
ai − cu =




(ai − cu)q = ki. (10)
Totally diﬀerentiating (10) w.r.t. ai and aj we get dai
daj = 1+λi−θi
θi ≥ 0. Totally diﬀerenti-











1 + λi − θi
θi
,
which is positive under the Assumption 1.
A.2 Investment decisions under infrastructure ﬁnancing with public funds
Using the ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t. ai, simple manipulations show that:
∂Wi
∂aj
= −θiq + (1 + λpf)(ai − cui)q0,
= −(1 + λpf)q < 0.
Total diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst-order condition characterizing the optimal access price in




(1 + λpf) − (1 + λpf − θj)δ
(1 + λpf) − δ[2(1 + λpf) − (θi + θj)]
,
which is positive under Assumption 1. Hence, the sign of the strategic eﬀect is given by
the sign of the strategic interaction between access prices.
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